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Justice and (Global) Constitutionalism: The International 
Criminal Court in the Global Order1 
 
 Can the International Criminal Court, as currently constituted in the international legal 
and political order, create a more just world order? We believe it can, but we argue here that 
more can be done to achieve this end. To make this argument, we propose a normative 
standard against which the Court’s activities and presence can be evaluated to explore 
whether or not it is providing both particular and global justice. We look to the institutional 
structure of the court, one of its cases, and its external relationship to the Security Council to 
make this argument concrete. 
 Justice is an elusive concept. It is similar to fairness, or the distribution of goods on 
the basis of some agreed upon metric. This metric might result from a historical process in 
which the past behaviour of individuals determines the goods they can receive. The metric 
might result from the standing of all members in a social and political context such as 
citizenship in a domestic society or humanity in a global society. Alternatively, the metric 
might be the result of the determination of needs, either seeking to correct past failures to 
distribute goods fairly or past failures in terms of patterns of exclusion or harm.  
 The issues at the core of this chapter – the protection of individuals from violence and 
the promotion of their human rights – concerns a different type of justice. International 
criminal justice, as with domestic criminal justice, ‘embodies notions of fairness to all 
members of the community, including victims and offenders, and striking a balance between 
their competing interests’.2   Concretely, it means two things: first, victims of crimes are 
given the opportunity to achieve retributive justice through a court system by seeing that 
those who have harmed them are prosecuted and punished; second, individuals who are 
charged with crimes are given the full protection of a legal system in which their rights to a 
fair trial are ensured. This conceptualization of justice as a form of protection of both victims 
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and perpetrators parallels the ideas of distributive justice in economic and social matters but it 
is not precisely the same.  
 Both distributive justice and criminal justice require law and politics nested within a 
functioning order. In other words, to achieve both kinds of justice, some form of a 
constitutional order is required. Justice cannot be given to one or two individuals, for it would 
no longer be justice; justice by definition requires fair distribution across an entire group. The 
content of that group requires some definition, which might be local, national, international or 
global. But, in whatever community it applies, justice would seem to require some 
application across an entire group.  
 The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
constitutional theory as it relates to questions of justice. This is followed by an explanation of 
the constitutional structure of the Court and its first ever case, particularly in relation to 
upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights (of both the accused and victims). The 
following section briefly explores the Court’s position in the global order by focusing on the 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council in terms of a global separation of 
powers. The final section uses the framing of constitutionalism and justice to evaluate the 
Court’s ability to achieve justice.  
 
Constitutionalism and Justice 
Constitutionalism is a political theory with two principle elements: 1) political power 
is used by people through law and institutions; 2) institutions and political leaders are limited 
by the law. Constitutionalism both enables the creation of institutions and laws and limits 
those who lead those institutions and execute those laws. Constitutionalism in the modern 
world implies the existence of a written constitution, though not all constitutional states have 
such a text (the United Kingdom being the most prominent example). Constitutionalism 
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achieves its enabling and limiting functions through four devices: the rule of law, separation 
of powers, constituent powers, and provision of rights.  
 Global constitutionalism is the idea there is a constitutional order at the global level. 
For some, this constitutionalism finds expression in the increasing constitutionalization of 
international law.3 This mode of constitutionalism gives primacy to states, though it suggests 
that there is a slow process by which states as the primary agents in the international order 
may be losing influence in relation to institutions and peoples as active drivers of political 
life. For instance, in an institution such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), states constitute the primary agents but the role 
played by other agents (companies, NGOs, experts) moves power and law-making outside the 
province of states alone. These developments do not imply that there will suddenly by a fully-
fledged global constitutional convention and a resulting written global constitution; rather, 
they suggest that various developments at different levels indicate important changes in the 
global political and legal order.  
Constitutions do not determine outcomes; they establish procedures by which political 
systems generate outcomes. Specifically, constitutions establish how laws are made 
(legislature), how they are executed (executive), and how disagreements concerning politics 
and law are decided (judicial). It is the laws, regulations, and court decisions that determine 
the outcomes in a political system. One might conclude from this that a constitution has little 
to do with justice and more to do with procedures that might or might not achieve justice.  
This is why constitutions and constitutionalism are sometimes seen as conservative 
institutions, for they do not necessarily create just outcomes. They might create such 
outcomes, but they do not determine them in advance. Instead, they create the conditions in 
which individuals can pursue the policies they find most amenable.  
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 Constitutions can advance justice in two ways. First, constitutions authorize political 
systems in which persons are equal. Equality tends to appear in two primary ways in a 
constitution: first, all persons are equally represented through an electoral system; and two, 
all people are treated equally before the law, whether they are convicted of a crime or victims 
of a crime. These fundamental elements of constitutional life give equality a central role.4  
 Second, most modern constitutional systems, including the global one, include a 
provision of rights. Rights establish a kind of just outcome, one in which individuals can 
claim against others something that they deserve. Especially as the kinds of rights that can be 
claimed have expanded beyond those concerning ‘civil and political’ to ‘economic and 
social’, they have moved closer to some conception of justice. That is, as noted above, justice 
is usually about a fair distribution of resources. So, when economic and social affairs are 
addressed through the frame of rights, such discourses become progressively more justice 
oriented, both at the domestic and global levels. 
 Together, these two points suggest that constitutions can contribute to creating a just 
political order, though they might not be able to precisely lay out a system in which specific 
standards can be achieved. There needs to be some potential for alterations and developments 
in constitutional life.  
Two examples demonstrate these points. The first comes from John Rawls, whose A 
Theory of Justice5 helped to resurrect debates and ideas about justice in the 20th century. The 
book makes two main points relevant for our analysis. First, Rawls proposed that in order to 
determine the institutional arrangements that would be most just, we should envision 
ourselves in an ‘original position’ that is posited behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ in which we do 
not know what kind of attributes, benefits or deficiencies we may have as individuals. This 
means that even if acting self-interestedly, we will choose to arrange society in such a way 
that it will be to the benefit of the worst off since we might well find ourselves in that 
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position.  Second, as a result of this starting point, Rawls proposes that we will choose to 
organize the political realm in such a way that it will guarantee that 1) each person has an 
equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all 2) social and 
economic inequalities can only be justified if they are to the benefit of the least advantaged, 
and 3) all offices and positions should be open to all members of society in accordance with 
the idea of equal opportunity. Rawls’ conception of justice incorporates both liberty and 
equality and seeks to establish how political structures can create outcomes that distribute 
wealth equally and fairly. There are numerous alternatives to Rawls’ account, but the point in 
highlighting his work here is to demonstrate how a theory of justice can relate to a 
constitutional structure. Rawls theory proposes how equality makes its way into 
constitutional life. By ensuring that all persons have equal access to opportunities, his liberal 
theory demonstrates how a constitutional structure can achieve justice.  
The second way constitutions achieve justice is through the provision of rights. Rather 
than a theorist of justice and/or constitutionalism, a good place to see how rights and 
constitutions connect is in debates about the American constitution at its founding. These 
debates centred on whether or not an enumeration of rights was necessary for the American 
constitution to function effectively. James Madison, one of the key drafters of the American 
constitutional text, did not at first believe that a list of rights was necessary. According to 
Madison, simply constructing a proper political system should create a procedural structure 
by which rights would be protected.6 During the debates about ratification that followed the 
crafting the constitution, however, it soon became evident to Madison and others that without 
an enumeration of rights, there was very little chance of the constitution being approved by 
the 13 constituent states that had created it. In this debate, and then in the course of European 
constitutional debates, rights became strongly associated with constitutions, resulting in the 
assumption that they are necessary part of any constitutional text and constitutional system. 
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These enumerated rights have progressively become part of the ideology which we think of 
as constitutionalism.7  
Constitutions advance justice through the establishment of equal treatment and the 
provision of rights. Do these criteria exist at the global level? There is clearly a strong and 
growing consensus around the importance of rights at the global level. Both international law 
and international institutions have become loci for the protection and advancement of rights 
in different ways.8 Some have pointed to how the global scope of rights has impacted 
domestic political and legal systems, creating a ‘global model of constitutional rights’.9 The 
criterion of equal treatment through institutional arrangements has been less well developed, 
however. Of course, equality is an important principle across any liberal order, including the 
international one. But, perhaps because of the different kinds of agents in the international 
order (i.e., states, NGOs, etc.) there has been less attention to equality among individual 
persons. Efforts to create a global parliament are perhaps one of the most prominent efforts to 
create global equality, but this is a long term ideal rather than a currently workable reality. 
Instead, there are some institutions that have sought to create more equality among 
individuals through the global political and legal order by building on current practices. One 
prominent example of this tendency is the institution of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  
 
The International Criminal Court  
The ICC can be evaluated in two ways according to the idea of constitutionalism. 
First, we can assess whether it can advance justice in particular cases in terms of the internal 
mechanisms by which it functions. This means evaluating the Court as a constitutional entity 
in terms of advancing the rule of law and protecting rights. Moreover, the interactions of the 
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Prosecutor with the Trial Chambers reflects a kind of separation of powers, one that works 
toward fairness and justice by ensuring no one entity has control over the process.  
The second way the Court can be evaluated is how it sits within the wider 
international order. This moves the argument from a constitutional to a global constitutional 
dimension. Here, we can explore the Court in two ways: first, in what ways does it react to 
global ‘executive’ bodies, specifically the United Nations Security Council. Second, in its 
judgments and actions, does the Court play any role in ‘legislating’ for the global political 
and legal order.  Because the internal functions deal with individual persons regardless of 
their nationality or citizenship, we refer to this as global constitutionalism. The interactions of 
the ICC with the Security Council reflects an international legal order in which states are the 
primary agents. As such, we refer to this set of interactions as international 
constitutionalism.10 
In order to explore these dimensions of the Court, the next section explores the 
Court’s functioning in a particular case, that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. In this case, the 
advancement of justice required the Court’s different parts to interact and balance each other, 
resulting in a prosecution that protected the rights of the accused but also brought justice to 
the victims. We then look at the Court’s relationship with the UN Security Council, 
suggesting that the current relationship is problematic in some ways by double standards that 
exist between non-states parties being able to utilise (and to some extent also dominate) the 
Court.  
 
Global Constitutionalism and the ICC’s internal functions  
 As is well known, the ICC came into being on 1 July 2002; it has 124 states parties 




The ICC has three different organs: the judicial division, the Assembly of State 
Parties and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The OTP is charged with investigating and 
prosecuting, it receives referrals and substantiated information on possible crimes within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. It decides on questions of jurisdiction and admissibility and ultimately 
whether or not to open an investigation into a particular situation. According to the Rome 
Statute, the Prosecutor has powers to act independently and impartially to protect the rule of 
law. The Statute has clear criteria for establishing admissibility (such as the principle of 
complementarity) but even though decisions on judicial intervention, i.e. on whether or not to 
open investigations into particular situations, are always political, this political process is 
law-governed. It is constrained by legal principles (such as requirements of gravity) that are 
clearly stipulated in the Rome Statute. Such guidelines and rules exist within the Statute to 
ensure a fair and representative process as much as possible. This focus on representativeness 
and fairness can also be seen in the ICC’s institutional set-up, such as the composition of the 
Judicial Divisions that consist of 18 judges that have been selected according to competence, 
experience and integrity.  
As argued earlier, the separation of powers is a crucial aspect of global 
constitutionalism. By both limiting the power of one particular actor within the system while 
at the same time enabling power, power is channelled towards productive and useful ends.  
Such a separation of powers can be seen within the ICC for instance by the Prosecutor 
working with states parties and the UN in order to gather relevant information and evidence 
about possible ICC crimes.  Before formally opening an investigation, the OTP needs to 
apply to a Pre-trial Chamber to establish admissibility. This separation of powers ensures that 
information is evaluated by different actors; the Prosecutor cannot act completely 
independently but is part of a law-governed structure that ensures procedural fairness. Based 
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on evidence provided by the Prosecutor, the Pre-trial chamber has the powers to issue 
summonses or arrest warrants and also to confirm charges against individual persons.  
The protection of rights is of course another crucial element within the Rome Statute 
and it speaks to this paper’s conception of justice as a form of protection for victims as well 
as perpetrators. In line with Article 53, the Prosecutor can desist from opening an 
investigation if it is not ‘in the interest of justice’. However, the Rome Statute gives little 
guidance on what criteria the OTP should apply to determine what those ‘interests’ might 
constitute beyond the obligation to consider the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims 
and the role of the alleged perpetrator. Once proceedings have started, the trial chambers are 
tasked with protecting the rights of the defence, victims and witnesses in equal measure. The 
chambers also have the responsibility to ensure fair and impartial proceedings and follow due 
process.  
Some of these different roles and responsibilities that are institutionalised in the Rome 
Statute conflict at times and the challenge lies in finding ways/procedures to ensure the ICC 
retains its legitimacy.  
 
The Lubanga trial and conflicting responsibilities 
In consideration of these criteria, the ICC’s first ever completed trial, that of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), is an interesting case as a 
number of its elements, such as the respect for the rule of law, the strict separation of powers 
and the protection of rights of the people directly affected by the trial (i.e. the accused as well 
as the victims) are all discernible in the disputes prior to the start of the proceedings. 
Different institutions within the ICC, namely the judicial chambers and the OTP, had 
differing views on their roles and responsibilities within the trial process.   
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The main disagreement lay in two, seemingly conflicting provisions within the Statute 
that both relate to the OTP’s responsibilities: Art. 54(3)(e) that sets out that the Prosecutor 
may not disclose information obtained on the condition of confidentiality and solely on the 
purpose of generating new evidence; and Article 67(2) that states that the Prosecutor is 
obliged to disclose evidence which might show the innocence of the accused or mitigate their 
guilt. The latter Article also provides that ‘in case of doubt as the application of this 
paragraph, the Court shall decide,’ which is exactly what happened in the proceedings ahead 
of the Lubanga trial.  
 
Brief background to the case 
On 23 June 2004, the OTP opened is first investigation of the ICC by looking into 
grave crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the DRC since 1 July 2002 (the date the 
Rome Statute entered into force). The DRC became states party of the ICC on 11 April 2002 
and referred the situation to the OTP in April 2004. On 17 March 2006 Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, founder and leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the commander-
in-chief of its military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) was 
arrested and surrendered to the Court. He was accused of enlisting and conscripting children 
under the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the DRC’s Ituri 
region from September 2002 to 13 August 2003. The crimes Lubanga was charged with are 
listed as war crimes under Articles 8 of the Rome Statute. The proceedings were halted twice 
before the actual trial started in January 2009. There was a clear tension between the OTP’s 
need to build a case and incentivise cooperation by ensuring confidentiality to its information 
providers on the one hand and the right of the accused to receive a fair trial by having access 
to any potentially exculpatory evidence on the other.  
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Lubanga’s was a relatively small case but a first for the ICC in many respects which 
made it so important for the ICC in order to demonstrate how it discharged its judicial 
functions and overcome tensions within its own Statute without compromising justice. As 
others have rightly argued: “the creation and efficient functioning of a new institution must 
begin somewhere. A fair trial of Thomas Lubanga is an essential step in attaining an effective 
and legitimate ICC. (…) If victims of war crimes do not feel as if the Tribunal is working in 
the interest of justice, the Tribunal cannot attain legitimacy.”12  
 
First stay of proceedings  
On 13 June 2008, Trial Chamber I imposed a stay on the proceedings against 
Lubanga,  arguing that the Prosecutor had misused the Rome Statute’s Article 54(3)(e) that 
allows the Prosecutor in exceptional circumstances to receive information or documents on 
the condition of confidentiality. This Article also stipulates that this can only be done if the 
information is then not used for trial but purely for generating new evidence. Trial Chamber I 
argued that “in highly restricted circumstances, the prosecution is given the opportunity to 
agree not to disclose material provided to it at any stage in the proceedings. … the only 
purpose of receiving this material should be that it is to lead to other evidence”.13 
The Trial Chamber was concerned that in this case the Prosecutor had misused this 
provision by not disclosing over 200 documents “which the prosecution accepts have 
potential exculpatory effect or which are material to defence preparation”.14 The Chamber 
argued that this inhibited the accused from preparing his defence and violated a ‘fundamental 
aspect of the accused's right to a fair trial’.15  Within the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber has 
powers to ‘stay’ proceedings if it deems that the rights of the accused have been violated.  
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The Trial Chamber was critical of the Prosecutor using confidentiality agreements 
routinely (rather than in exceptional circumstances) and also inappropriately. The Trial 
Chamber held that the Prosecutor used the Statute’s provisions to  
obtain a wide range of materials under the cloak of confidentiality. … The prosecution’s 
approach constitutes a wholesale and serious abuse, and a violation of an important 
provision which was intended for the prosecution to receive evidence confidentially, and 
in very restricted circumstances.16  
 
The language used by the Trial Chamber in making this assessment shows clearly that it had 
lost its faith in the OTP’s approach to ensure a fair trial (e.g. calling its approach “a wholesale 
and serious abuse”). This is problematic for the trial process, because ‘the premise of an 
approach that allows the Prosecution to resolve conflicts between confidential lead evidence 
and disclosure is that the Prosecution can be trusted when it performs this function to protect 
the rights of the Accused’.17  
 
The Trial Chamber asked the Prosecutor to disclose all potentially exculpatory information to 
the accused. In this case the information was provided by the UN and NGOs with agreement 
that the documents would not be disclosed. The information providers where keen to sign up 
to such agreements because they were concerned about protecting their operations on the 
ground, shield their personnel from possible retaliation and also protect the security of their 
sources.18 Understandably, requirements of a fair trial were not of central importance to 
them.19 The Trial Chamber aimed to uphold this important provision within the ICC Statute, 
however, to ensure the trial process is a just one, not only for victims but also for the accused.  
It concluded that disclosing the relevant information was necessary for a right to fair trial, 
which it called “without doubt a fundamental right”.20 . The Chamber stressed that it was not 
up to the Prosecutor to decide which materials should be made available to the accused, 
stressing the clear separation of powers to safeguard interests of justice and fairness.  
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The Trial Chamber had to strike a balance between ensuring the right to a fair trial for 
the accused with giving victims the possibility to achieve justice by holding those responsible 
for serious crimes accountable for their actions. Both, victims and accused, are constituents of 
the Court and the question is whether and which one needs to be prioritised? Arguably both 
have an interest in fair and just proceedings to ensure that the outcome of the trial is not 
tarnished by accusations of illegitimacy or irregularity.  
 
OTP Response and Appeals Chamber Decision  
On 23 June, the OTP appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision, refuting the claim that it 
had used confidentiality agreements inappropriately.21 The Prosecutor argued that 
information providers insisted on making information subject to confidentiality and that it 
was therefore not a matter of choice but one of legal obligation that it would not disclose 
information. He claimed that he would not have received the information in the first place 
had he not agreed to confidentiality. This highlights a clear inherent tension in the trial 
proceeding between the Prosecutor’s roles of building a case against an individual while at 
the same time having to satisfy requirements for a fair trial for the accused.   
On 21 October 2008, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the OTP’s appeal to halt the 
proceedings.22 It confirmed the ICC Statute’s provision that the Prosecutor could only rely on 
confidentiality for the purpose of generating new evidence and must not lead to breaches of 
obligations towards the accused. The Appeals Chamber held that decisions on whether any 
particular (potentially exculpatory) evidence needed to be disclosed had to be made by the 
Judicial Divisions, not the OTP. It argued that it was up to the judicial divisions (and not the 
OTP) to assess whether certain information needed to be disclosed in order to uphold the 
Court’s institutionalised separation of power. It also raised concerns that if the accused was 
unable to prepare for the trial, any verdict would potentially be unsafe because there would 
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always be the question whether the undisclosed material would have made a difference to the 
outcome.23 This would then frustrate justice for both, the victims as well as the accused. 
This issue was eventually resolved on 18 November 2008 when the stay of 
proceedings was lifted and the trial date scheduled for 26 January 2009.  The information 
providers had agreed to give complete access to all relevant undisclosed documents to both 
Judicial Divisions and the trial could begin. 
 
Second stay of proceedings 
On 8 July 2010, however, Trial Chamber I ordered another stay of proceedings in the 
case, arguing that a fair trial of the accused was not possible because the OTP refused to 
implement an order it had been given. The Trial Chamber argued that “in order for the 
Chamber to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, it is necessary that its orders, 
decisions and rulings are respected, unless and until they are overturned on appeal, or 
suspended by order of the Court”.24  
The Court had ordered very limited disclosure of one intermediary’s identity, adding 
that protective measures had been offered and agreed with the intermediary in question as 
well as the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU). The OTP claimed, however, that it was 
responsible for the protection of the witness and that it could therefore not disclose his/her 
identity within the set time limits. The Prosecution referred to its own legal and statutory 
duties that conflicted with having to disclose information that might compromise that 
individual’s protection. There was a clear tension between the OTP that claimed that a 
witness might be in danger and the Trial Chamber that argued that the Prosecution had to 
follow its orders.  
The Chamber was frustrated with the Prosecutor’s refusal to follow its orders and 
considered this to be a breach of the separation of powers, institutionalised in the ICC Statute 
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that ensures a fair and just process to all involved. It was concerned that the Prosecutor 
claimed to have autonomy with regard to whether or not to comply with Court orders 
depending on his interpretations of his responsibilities in accordance with the ICC Statute. 
The Chamber argued that the Statute provided that the judicial division was ultimately 
responsible for protective measures once proceedings had started, not the Prosecutor.  
 
The judicial division’s arguments show a clear focus on global constitutionalism’s 
rule of law, protection of rights and separation of powers in this instance. The Trial Chamber 
held that “No criminal court can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an order in a 
particular area, it is for the Prosecutor to elect whether or not to implement it, depending on 
his interpretation of his obligations”.25 Its main criticism was based on the Prosecutor 
claiming “a separate authority which can defeat the orders of the Court, and which thereby 
involves a profound, unacceptable and unjustified intrusion into the role of the judiciary”.26  
 
The Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor did not comply with binding Court 
orders and reaffirmed the Trial Chamber’s role as “the ultimate guardian of a fair and 
expeditious trial”.27 It argued that if there was a conflict between the Prosecutor’s perception 
of his duties and a Trial Chamber’s order, the latter’s views needed to prevail, calling this 
process “a fundamental criterion for any trial to be fair.”28 The Appeals Chamber decided, 
however, that the Trial Chamber should not have ordered a stay of proceedings without first 
imposing sanctions to bring about the Prosecutor’s compliance with its orders and that the 
trial could resume. 
On 14 March 2012, after 2 years of trial proceedings and six years after his arrest, 
Lubanga was eventually convicted of committing, as co-perpetrator, war crimes related to the 
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use of child soldiers. His sentence of 14 years imprisonment was confirmed by the Appeals 
Chamber on 1 December 2014.  
  In terms of constitutional theory, it can be argued that the Court in this particular case 
has advanced justice. By ensuring that the accused was treated fairly and that the Prosecutor’s 
Office could not ride rough shod over the rights of the accused, the Court ensured the 
protection of the accused’s rights. The judicial division protected the ICC’s separation of 
power that avoids one organ becoming too powerful. At the same time, the Court did find 
Lubanga guilty through a measured process that protected the rights of all involved. This 
provided justice to the accused but also – and perhaps more importantly - the individuals who 
were subject to the violence.  
 In the next section, we move away from the particulars of a specific case and toward 
the wider global context in which the Court is located by exploring the relationship of the 
Court to the UN Security Council.  
 
Separating from (and Working with) the United Nations Security Council 
 The Court is a treaty based organization and thus has legitimacy and authority on the 
basis of positive international law. Its origins in a treaty give it more legitimacy, perhaps, 
than the international criminal tribunals that were created by the UN Security Council 
through resolutions and thereby imposed on states. Its standing in the international legal 
order, in other words, is formally very strong. This formal strength is weakened on a practical 
level by the refusal of key great powers to join, including three of the P5 (Russia, China and 
the United States). This political weakness has evolved to some extent, however, if one looks 
at the gradual acceptance of the Court by the United States. For instance, the government of 
George W. Bush, despite its initial hostility to the Court, abstained from voting on issuing an 
indictment against the President of Sudan in 2005 (i.e. it did not veto the decision). In 2009, 
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with Obama coming into office, the US engaged even more with the ICC and took an active 
role in drafting the UNSC Resolution that issued indictments for the Libyan leader, 
Muammar Gaddafi, and two others during the campaign against Libya in 2011.29 These two 
referrals provide tacit acknowledgment of the role that the Court can play in international 
efforts to protect human rights and advance international criminal law.  
 So, in accordance with traditional international law and politics, the Court has a 
somewhat paradoxical status. It is, on the one hand, clearly established in the legal order but, 
on the other hand, subject to a lack of political legitimacy because of the failure of the 
powerful agents in the system to fully accept its role. (As noted, this might be changing as the 
great powers begin to accept its role.) Rather than focussing on these formal legal and 
political categories, however, a different way to see the status of the Court is through an 
international constitutional model. The Court sits on its own in terms of its treaty-based 
legitimacy, but it has connections to other institutions in the international order, specifically 
the United Nations.  
 
During the Rome conference, the P5 (and especially the US) wanted to give more 
power to the Security Council by being able to halt proceedings before the ICC. This was not 
accepted by the majority of states, however, and a compromise was negotiated. Article 16 
allows the Security Council to adopt a resolution to defer any investigation for a period of 12 
months (renewable) in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This so-called 
‘Singapore Compromise’ was an attempt to give the Council the ability to prevent 
prosecutions taking place in situations of ongoing conflict, yet not allow such deferrals to be 
permanent.  
During the Rome conference, the US also wanted to restrict the Court to Security 
Council referrals alone. This was not supported by the majority of states that argued in 
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favour of state party referrals as well as the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor. This 
result allows the ICC to act regardless of the Security Council which prevents the latter from 
becoming too powerful– at least with regard to absolutely dominating the Court as 
independent judicial mechanism. The negotiations in Rome also meant a move away from a 
complete state-centeredness when it comes to international criminal justice, taking the 
victims (as yet another constituent of the Court) into account.  By giving the Prosecutor 
independent powers, there is no need to wait for state interests to come into play before the 
ICC can investigate a particular situation. 
One can argue that the two ad hoc tribunals on the other hand, were attempts by the 
Council to take over a judicial function in addition to being the executive and legislative on 
certain aspects. The ICC can therefore be seen to constitute a clear ‘improvement’ on the 
previous work of the Security Council, seeking to dominate the international legal and 
political order. Had the US succeeded in its proposals that the Court could only act if the 
Council instructed it to do so, the Council would then have institutionalised its judicial 
function in the international order.   
Security Council referrals do not require state consent and – because they are based 
on a Council resolution – are binding on all UN member states. This still gives the Council a 
more powerful and central role when it comes to Court action and also highlights the double 
standards the Council is working with.30 But this might not be as problematic for a global 
constitutional ideal as it currently stands, because, as Bosco argued: “Double standards are 
deeply rooted in existing global governance structures, and the new court appears more 
likely to reflect those than to alter them…. The court’s first decade suggests that it may be 
possible to design international institutions around power – but not to escape it”.31  
Indeed, we would argue that combining law and politics is precisely what a 
constitutional order can do, so reflecting power in a constitutional relationship is not 
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necessarily a negative outcome. Certainly, the relationship between law and politics is 
complicated. While a decision to prosecute a crime is certainly political in part, no matter 
where its origin, the benefit of limiting the role of the Security Council is that it gives more 
legal legitimacy to the process. Security Council referrals are political decisions, but there is 
a clear separation to the Court as a judicial institution because the Court uses clear legal 
criteria in its process, i.e. moving away from politics towards the rule of law. As Fatou 
Bensouda, the current Prosecutor, notes: “In part, of course, such referrals do reflect political 
choices. However, once a situation has been referred to the Court, a judicial process ensues 
and only legal criteria and legal standards apply.”32  
 On one level, this is simply a matter of negotiating an international legal treaty in 
light of the influence of a powerful actor. If looked at through the lens of international 
constitutionalism, however, it raises some important questions about a global separation of 
powers. The separation of powers idea, called ‘checks and balances’ in US constitutional 
law, is based on some different premises. For the American founders, it was a principle 
designed to limit the power of any one agent in the political order. This is not just about 
limiting the executive, for it was the problem of a British parliament having too much power 
that also animated the founders.33  There is also a functional logic in the separation of 
powers which assumes that when each agent pursues its particular role, the system is more 
efficient.34 An older argument, one sometimes called the mixed constitution, reflects the idea 
that different agents in a political order will reflect different interests.35 In all these different 
accounts, though, there is a balance to be found between coordination and conflict. It is 
important that some conflict must exist between the different branches, for if they acted in 
unison there would be no need for any type of separation. Some level of coordination is also 




 The American demand for a stronger role for the UN Security Council could be 
justified in accordance with the pragmatic idea of allowing different branches of government 
to work together; it is indeed true that if the Security Council is unable to pursue peace 
operations because of the Court pursuing a prosecution, the system will break down.36 
Undoubtedly, the American demand is not just derived from a hope that the UN Security 
Council will function effectively, as the protection of US power is also relevant here. 
Moreover, American international lawyers such as Ruth Wedgwood and Jack Goldsmith 
who objected to the Court37 often argue that the US constitution would be compromised by 
participation in the Court. This argument is ironic in that it is a fundamental principle of US 
constitutionalism that checks and balances is one of the best protections against the 
aggrandizement of power.38 
 The fact that there exists a formalized relationship between the Court and the 
Council indicates that there is a constitutional structure in place. The fact that the 
relationship is a conflictual one might also be a reflection of a constitutional structure, for 
constitutionalism is not just about law but also about political power. The fact that the 
relationship does not seem to have produced productive outcomes, however, means that 
perhaps this arrangement is not as fully constitutional as it should be; that is, there is a 
formalized structure in place, but it is not a structure that is creating a just outcome at least if 
measured by the ability of the Court to prosecute cases and still allow the Council to pursue 
peaceful outcomes to ongoing conflicts.  Constitutional systems evolve, so the current state 
of affairs between the Court and Council need not be the same forever. As the United States 
has moderated its attitude toward the Court, the relationship between the Court and the 
Council may well see improvements in the future.39 At this stage, the current structure 
reflects a weak constitutional relationship, one that we hope will evolve into a more robust, 





Our argument has sought to demonstrate that the ICC can advance justice in the 
international order. To make this normative judgment we set out a standard drawn from the 
political theory of constitutionalism as a way to assess its ability to achieve justice. In 
explaining this normative ideal, we began by noting that the constitutionalism can be applied 
to the internal functions of the Court, which we see as an instantiation of global 
constitutionalism. To assess the internal functions, we drew on one specific case, that of 
Thomas Lubanga. What these arguments have shown is that the different organs within the 
ICC had to ‘battle’ to find the best way for the Court to work in the interest of justice – i.e. 
the protection of rights for the victims as well as the accused. A number of authors have 
observed that in this case the OTP over-relied on confidentiality agreements to build its case 
against Lubanga.40 Even though the OTP’s argument that it would not have been able to 
receive information had it not been for these agreements, might be true, it is generally agreed 
that the Prosecutor took this too far and was eventually reigned back in by the ICC’s judicial 
division. It became clear that the problem was not so much the Statute’s possibly conflicting 
Articles but the approach of the Prosecutor to abuse his powers:  
the habit of presenting evidence for disclosure and redaction in large amounts and at a 
late stage in the proceedings, does not stem from a misunderstanding of the Statute 
and the Rules, but seems to point at prosecutorial mismanagement and disregard for 
fundamental rights of the accused, while at the same time excluding the Chamber 
from verifying the materials.41 
 
Arguably, different Articles in the Statute do contain conflicting rules and the ICC’s 
institutions had to find ways of interpreting them. The ICC’s first case was inevitably divisive 
with differing interests of its various constituencies. A clear separation of powers between the 
different units within the Court is given and – in this case - the judicial divisions acted as 
‘guardians’ of the rule of law by protecting the accused’s right to a fair trial. This is in line 
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with this chapter’s conception of justice as a form of protection – in this case from the OTP’s 
over-reliance on confidentiality that threatened to undermine the fair trial process.  
The second part of our chapter sought to briefly lay out the status of the Court in the 
wider international legal and political order, which we see as an instantiation of international 
constitutionalism. In this section, we briefly looked at the relationship of the Court to the UN 
Security Council. In this situation, the Court has played an important role in creating a more 
just order by establishing a judicial power that is separate from and counter to the Security 
Council. At the same time, it also is one that can work with the Council in order to achieve 
peace and justice for victims. While this relationship is constitutional in part, it is perhaps the 
place where the Court needs to become even more constitutional especially if constitutional is 
seen as a means to seek justice. If the Court can continue to work with the Council and with 
its powerful permanent members, the effectiveness of the system will increase. But if the 
Court allows the Council to advance particular interests of its powerful agents, this will 
undermine its ability to seek justice.   
This chapter is part of a larger effort to explore constitutionalism in and around the 
ICC. We explore other elements of the Court, such as support for victims and the role of the 
Assembly of State Parties as part of this ongoing research effort. We see this chapter as 
setting out briefly how the ICC reflects both global and international constitutionalism, and, 
in so doing, can contribute to a more just world order.  
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